Surpassing Liberal Democracy
From presidential transfers of power insecurities in Brazil to Peru, wherein massive statewide protests have transpired against the respective administration’s political legitimacy; to rightwing white working class voters in the US denouncing the existing administration’s validity, coupled with Republican senators willing to deny the future president elect and how human rights viz abortion can be revoked with enough support of one ideological stance in a political institution; to the recent resignation of the UK prime minister over unsuccessful economic policy initiatives in the short-term; to France’s demonstrations against the newly proposed pension policy from Macron, echoing the prior Yellow Vests movement; to Italian president Giorgia Meloni, a pro-Mussolini politician who spearheads a strong coalition of ultra-conservative rightwing populist parties in the country, intent on materializing Christian traditional values by revoking the individual rights of ethnic and sexual minorities; to Catalonian near-universal consensus on national sovereignty that has been denied by Spain, who operate jurisdiction over them and considers all continued independence efforts as unconstitutional (resulting in the customary parliamentary method of diplomatic negotiations among leaders of both governments, whereupon the more powerful state can dictate the terms of agreement for the “accepted” treaty by both sides); to the opposite end of Europe in Ukraine where Zelensky persistently presses NATO to strengthen their military support through diplomatic efforts at the institutional — UN, summits — and interpersonal — direct communications — level, only capturing vain symbolic support; to Belarus where former protesters against Lukashenko’s illegitimate reign — corruptive practices in their national elections — have been subject to state violence; to Hungary’s decades long, publicly explicit, process to transform its representative democracy to authoritarian capitalism through constitutional revisions that limit judicial authority, in addition to Orban’s efforts to implement one-party rule; to Turkey’s similar adoption of anti-democratic measures, including purging the ruling party’s government opponents and the liquidation of other political parties affected by Erdogan’s top officials; to Serbian statesmen that repeatedly reject the sovereignty of Kosovo despite consecutive political acts legitimizing its independence that were recognized by the ICJ; into Asia whereupon Israel’s further regression into authoritarianism with president Netanyahu’s ploy to unilaterally strip the powers of the judicial system and violate the rule of law; to Lebanon and Iraq, where mass protests from 2019 to 2021 caused the forced resignations of government cabinets amidst their failures to combat the socioeconomic conditions of the poor population, as well as institute wide-reaching reforms to eliminate public corruption and reverse deregulation that favors the rich; to the ousted Pakistani rightwing populist leader Imran Khan, insisting that the general elections for the country’s next president start immediately, instead of its official start date later in the year; to Modi’s de facto autocratic monarchic rule in India, where the masses hope to overcome his family’s long-standing government rule in 2024, but face total dominance of pro-Modi policy makers in parliament. These simultaneous events are a small set of examples indicating the prevalent democratic crisis across the world. They share the underlying common feature of a systemic inability: the ongoing failure of liberal democracy to be well-equipped and effective enough to solve the numerous societal issues taking place. When democratic procedures cannot solve a crisis through direct engagement: peaceful negotiations, diplomatic relations, bi-partisan compromise, open debates, etcetera, then the invariable material reactions lean towards social unrest, suspension of parliamentary mechanisms and rightwing dictatorships.
These elements have been predominantly facilitated and exploited by rightwing populism and authoritarianism, the main socio-political reactions to the failures of liberal democracy. Analyzing global capitalism today: its scope continues to undermine western democracy since such a pervasive system cannot be regulated by liberal democratic mechanisms, given they are intrinsically limited within nation-states (there is no global democracy that has the necessary purview in the sense like there is globalization, which interconnects different economies under the capitalist framework). Given this, more and more people lose trust in democratic institutions to enact their will — which is where protests such as Occupy Wall St and Yellow Vests illustrate this discontent towards liberal democracy. Now the purpose of scrutinizing the political realm is to highlight how the structural issues found in liberal democracy function as the basic groundwork that underlies the rest of society. Given this, the primary area of struggle for an improved social order is politics, whereby liberal democracy is the kernel that must be supplanted.
How do you bypass liberal democracy without reverting into authoritarianism? The attempts conceptualized so far, ranging from direct democracy to congregations of local democratic rule, fail to answer basic questions: how to organize the supposed daily gathering of millions for political activities, how to sustain strong alienating mechanisms by the state, etc. Some possible avenues are constitutional referendums that try to reformulate the basic building blocks of a political-legal order, which can — hopefully- adequately articulate the basic demands of the majority population. Chile is currently underway in this avenue, venturing to undo the damage of the prior legal order it had (Pinochet legacy), and instill a democracy along the lines of social justice and socioeconomic equality. but will it work? Or more importantly, how effective can it be before the same type of problems re-emerge? Will replacing the president really do anything if the next president ultimately fails too? Or better yet, how useful can a president be if they try to institute extensive political reforms, only to be met with failure if their party does not hold a majority in parliament or the supreme court? All these questions are not only tough to answer but must be articulated in such ways where they can be understood and engaged by ordinary people. For Chile, it will inevitably experience the same struggles insofar as it is inscribed within a representative type of democracy.
The partial answer for myself emerges through the imperatives of a global political body that can directly intervene into the economy and establish key public services that are universally free / low cost for the masses. The potential unintended consequences of this include human rights violations, tyrannical measures, permanent states of emergency marked by military presence in daily life, and so on. However, the future remains open both in terms of uncertainty and contingency, so that having greater social control which equates to a proper political economy must be embraced in the west. The mechanisms to implement this without retrogressing to the titular example of China, is the concern. But what the western world can learn from China are the positive dimensions of its management; notably, its long-term economic planning and ability to quickly mobilize its policies — something that could not be done without a degree of social control (this was the leading cause for China’s continued success in combating the pandemic). Because China has a one-party political system, it can quickly implement and successfully practice policies passed by the state since there is no political opposition, and all focus is rendered on those measures by the multiple layers of government. Enticing as it is to avoid filibustering, legislative procrastination, economic debates and so on as a means to efficiently carry out all decisions made by the state, such strong authoritarianism found within China should not be replicated by western democracies.
How an international political authority can be established without nation-states using their power and political alliances to leverage greater influence is indeed an obstacle. My wager would not be some epic, spontaneous moment of ethical greatness whereby leaders realize the urgency of the situation today, to which they all at once renounce their personal, economic, and political interests. No, instead it would be out of pure necessity that leaders will reluctantly work together, and thereby realize it is in all states best interests to do so. I am optimistic here and do think political miracles can come about. But what would an alternative type of democratic system to liberal democracy hypothetically look like? I am not entirely sure yet. What I do know is that there must be serious thought put into it and to be prepared for any unforeseen dangers/circumstances that arise — or else necessary reversals of positive visions will ensue.
